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Labor Market Measures 
in the Crisis and the 
Convergence of Social Models 
Michele Tiraboschi
Silvia Spattini
Adapt and Marco Biagi Centre for International and 
Comparative Studies, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
FRAMING THE ISSUE
Following the GDP decreases resulting from the severe economic 
crisis, EU member states experienced, each to a different extent, higher 
levels of unemployment. However, the implementation of so-called 
anticrisis measures limited such increases in unemployment—in some 
cases they were not as high as expected—in the majority of EU member 
states. Intending to minimize the impact of the downturn in social terms 
and support both companies and employees, the EU took a number of 
actions to drive the economic recovery and coordinate EU member 
states’ public interventions, with member states either adapting exist-
ing labor market policies or introducing new ones (European Commis-
sion 2008).1 In this context, the majority of member states launched ad 
hoc and comprehensive “anticrisis packages” consisting of a variety 
of measures to cope with the recession and resulting in a wide range 
of public policy tools aimed at reducing the impact of the crisis on the 
labor market.
During the economic downturn, some countries have performed 
much better than others. We set out to determine whether this hap-
pened by chance or if it was a consequence of the national social model 
and the choices governments made in applying specifi c labor market 
measures. In fact, the purpose of our study is to identify whether there 
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were particular legal devices and policies that helped some EU mem-
ber states to face and withstand the crisis better than others. Studying 
the different measures implemented by the member states and consid-
ering the national legal framework and labor regulations, this chapter 
offers some possible interpretations of the different national reactions 
to the crisis. These interpretations take into account EU member states’ 
different labor market policy combinations and their social protection 
systems and employment protection legislation, which is also viewed 
as a combination of fl exibility and security tools. The study has an inter-
disciplinary approach, though it is not an economic analysis. However, 
it aims to give suggestions and make some hypotheses on the effective-
ness of labor market policy combinations and social models (including 
the relevant legal framework) in tackling the crisis, which economists 
may then prove through their analyses. 
THE CRISIS IN FIGURES
The starting point of the study is the set of fi gures describing the 
changes in the European labor market from the beginning of the cri-
sis (see Figures 7.1–7.3 and Table 7.1). Between the second quarter of 
2008 and the second quarter of 2009, the real GDP in the EU (27 mem-
ber states) fell by almost 5 percent. 
The fall in GDP caused a reduction of labor demand and, accord-
ingly, an increase in unemployment and a decrease in employment. But, 
if you compare the two series of data—GDP and employment change 
from the previous period (Table 7.1)—the degree of the reduction is 
different, and in particular job losses are limited by comparison with 
the decrease of real GDP. As is well-known, in fact, GDP growth and 
employment generally evolve differently (Bell and Blanchfl ower 2011), 
since employment reacts to economic developments with a certain time 
lag (Hijman 2009; Mandl and Salvatore 2009).
The fi gures show a considerable difference in the impact of the crisis 
on the 27 EU member states, particularly if we compare unemployment 
rates in July 2008—that is, before the crisis—and July 2010. Although 
Spain and Ireland were regarded as emerging economies before the 
downturn, they reported signifi cant increases in unemployment. More 
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specifi cally, the levels of unemployment almost doubled in a two-year 
span, an issue that has become a matter of serious concern. The same 
happened in the Baltic states (Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia), which 
experienced the highest rates of unemployment in Europe (Figure 7.2).
Looking at the trends in Figure 7.3, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Ire-
land, and Spain also had the highest decrease in employment rates. A 
case in point of the negative impact of the economic crisis on employ-
ment was Denmark. Before the crisis, Denmark had a low level of unem-
ployment and has experienced a worsening of its labor market situation 
during the economic downturn. Despite Danish unemployment levels 
(7.3 percent in July 2010) remaining lower than the EU average (9.7 
percent), Denmark experienced a critical increase in unemployment, 
which doubled over a two-year period. At the same time, the employ-











2008Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4 2009Q1 2009Q2 2009Q3 2009Q4 2010Q1 2010Q2 2010Q3
EU 27
Figure 7.1  GDP Percentage Change from Previous Period
SOURCE: Eurostat, seasonally adjusted and adjusted data by working days.
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The labor market is less worrisome in countries like Germany, Aus-
tria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy, where the rise in the unem-
ployment rate was in no case higher than 1.8 percent and the decrease 
in the rate of employment was not as signifi cant as in the countries men-
tioned above. Indeed, Germany represents a unique case: after a very 
limited increase in unemployment (0.4 percent in July 2009 compared 
to July 2008), an unexpected reduction was reported in 2010, with the 
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Unemployment rate 2010Q2
Figure 7.2  Unemployment Rate Change and Unemployment Rate, 
2010Q2
SOURCE: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat data.
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Figure 7.3  Change in Employment Rate 2010Q2 − 2008Q2
SOURCE: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat data.
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ability among European countries, and the fact that the recession had 
little impact on some of them, seems not to be coincidental. There is 
some empirical evidence that the different performance levels within 
national labor markets could result from the diversifi ed legal framework 
of labor regulation and existing labor market policies and institutions, 
along with new measures taken by governments to combat the crisis.
ANTICRISIS MEASURES ACROSS EUROPE
The combination of several factors at the national level produced, 
in fact, 27 different ways in which the economic downturn hit the EU 
member states. In addition, there were 27 different responses to the cri-
sis. Each country has adopted a set of measures—not a single action—
among which it is possible to identify the most frequently implemented 
ones (European Commission 2009). Moreover, it is necessary to take 
into consideration that labor market policies adopted by national gov-
Table 7.1  GDP and Employment Change between 2008Q2 and 2009Q2
Member state GDP Employment Member state GDP Employment
EU27 −5.1 −1.9 Lithuania −16.0 −6.0
Belgium −4.1 −0.2 Luxembourg −7.8 1.2
Bulgaria −4.6 −1.8 Hungary −7.4 −2.3
Czech Republic −4.8 −0.9 Malta −4.4 −0.1a
Denmark −7.3 −2.2 Netherlands −5.1 −1.2
Germany −5.5 −0.0 Austria −5.4 −1.0
Estonia −16.5 −9.9 Poland +1.4 +0.8
Ireland −7.7 −8.3 Portugal −3.0 −2.7
Greece −2.0 −0.7 Romania −8.3 −2.0a
Spain −4.4 −7.0 Slovenia −9.5 −1.4
France −3.1 −1.3 Slovakia −4.9 −1.5
Italy −6.4 −1.4 Finland −10.2 −2.9
Cyprus −1.7 −0.4a Sweden −6.3 −2.2a
Latvia −17.3 −13.2 United Kingdom −5.9 −2.1
aNot seasonally adjusted data. 
SOURCE: Eurostat, National Accounts.
up12lartw0ch7.indd   142 10/12/2012   12:57:47 PM
Labor Market Measures in Social Models   143
ernments vary considerably, especially in terms of issues concerning the 
role played by social partners in each country. Each country’s partici-
pation in the development and implementation of anticrisis measures 
and with the adjustment of existing labor market tools differs across 
Europe. Differences are also found when one considers the level and 
the extent of the involvement of each EU member state in public policy 
design. Policy development and implementation depend on the diver-
sity of functions performed by the social dialogue at the time, and the 
power of each government. 
In Austria, Belgium, Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands—coun-
tries with a well-established social partnership—agreements between 
social partners contributed considerably to the creation of stimu-
lus packages. With regard to collective bargaining, opening clauses 
allowed company-level agreements to deviate from sectoral collective 
agreements in order to cut costs and safeguard employment (i.e., devia-
tion from the general framework). These agreements usually envisage 
an extension in working time without full compensation in pay, cuts in 
working time, cuts in benefi ts, or delays in agreed pay increases (ILO 
2011b). 
In order to assess the effectiveness of the adopted policies, it is nec-
essary to review existing legislation and classify measures implemented 
by every European country in accordance with a simple scheme. The 
classifi cation of policy measures is a preliminary step for verifying 
whether there is a relationship between patterns of labor market policies 
adopted by member states and the trends of the national labor market 
during the crisis. To date, key reports from the European Commission 
(Arpaia et al. 2010; Hurley et al. 2009; Mandl and Salvatore 2009), the 
OECD (2010), and EU institutions (Employment Committee [EMCO] 
and the European Commission [EC] 2010) have analyzed public inter-
ventions in the labor market. In particular, the Eurofound has provided 
a useful classifi cation of crisis-related measures implemented in the EU 
member states (see Table 7.2) (Hurley et al. 2009; Mandl and Salvatore 
2009). This classifi cation is based on three different types of interven-
tions: 1) measures to create employment or to promote reintegration, 
2) measures to maintain employment, and 3) income support measures 
for the unemployed. 
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Table 7.2  Classifi cation of Labor Market Measures
Measures to create employment 
or to promote reintegration
Income support measures 
for the unemployed Measures to maintain employment
Job matching, counseling, career 
guidance:
• Improving public employment 
services




• Duration of support for entitlement 
groups of workers
Support of short-time work or temporary 
layoff
• Wage subsidies
• Social security contributions
Incentives for companies to employ 
additional workers
• Wage subsidies
• Reduction of/exemption from non-
wage labor costs
• Nonfi nancial incentives
Other instruments
• early retirement payment
• child benefi ts
• housing/heating
Training support
• Advice/consultancy to enterprises
• Contribution to training costs
• Wage subsidy
(Re-) Training of the unemployed:
• Income support while in training 
• Advice/consultancy, skill assessment 
tools
• Provision/organization of training
• Contribution to training costs
Reduction/deferral of nonwage labor 
costs







• risk-capital schemes, guarantees, 
direct subsidies
• reduction of company taxes
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• Incentives for consumers’ purchases
up12lartw
0ch7.indd   145
up12lartw
0ch7.indd   145
10/12/2012   12:57:48 PM
10/12/2012   12:57:48 PM
146   Tiraboschi and Spattini
Measures to Create Employment and to Promote Reintegration
Measures to create employment (Mandl and Salvatore 2009) aim 
to promote the hiring of employees by means of economic incentives, 
mainly consisting of a reduction of nonwage labor costs and wage subsi-
dies or public sector job creation. In some countries (Germany, France, 
Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, and Sweden), the economic incentives for 
companies are provided for hiring special target groups. Support mea-
sures for self-employment, based on the provision of consultancy and 
training (the U.K. and Bulgaria), or the reduction/deferment of social 
security payments also falls within this category. Several member states 
(Austria, Lithuania, Italy, Portugal, and the U.K.) have introduced or 
extended subsidies for business start-ups.
Measures to promote reintegration into employment (Hurley et 
al. 2009), put into action by employment services, try to enhance the 
transition from unemployment to employment by addressing job mis-
match, supporting job matching by means of counseling, career guid-
ance, search assistance, activation measures, and by increasing employ-
ability through training. Efforts have been made to improve and adapt 
public employment services in order to manage the higher number of 
“clients” (for example, hiring additional staff, as in Germany, Norway, 
Spain, and the U.K.) and to economically support private employment 
agencies through economic and/or normative incentives (the Nether-
lands and Italy). In the same vein, and with the goal of making workers 
more willing to accept a new job, mobility grants are envisaged (Slo-
vakia, Lithuania, and the Czech Republic). In Belgium, for instance, 
employees who agree to relocate in order to accept a job offer obtain 
tax benefi ts.
Income Support for Unemployed People
Income support for unemployed people (Hurley et al. 2009; Mandl 
and Salvatore 2009) mainly consists of unemployment benefi ts, pro-
vided to reduce the socioeconomic consequences of job loss. Unem-
ployment benefi t systems exist in every EU member state, even though 
amendments (in some cases temporary) have been made at a national 
level to their regulations in order to respond to the increased number 
of unemployed people resulting from the crisis. Relevant changes have 
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been particularly concerned with the following areas: eligibility crite-
ria, amount, duration of entitlement, and benefi ciaries. More specifi -
cally, some countries relaxed the rules for entitlement to unemployment 
benefi ts (France, Finland, and Sweden), while others extended the dura-
tion: Romania has envisaged an extension of 3 months, Latvia extended 
the unemployment benefi t receipt period to 9 months, and in Poland it 
moved from 12 to 18 months. In the Czech Republic, the government 
has opted for an increase in the amount of funds, while Italy introduced 
(on a temporary basis) special benefi ts for quasi-subordinate workers.
Measures to Maintain Employment
Measures to maintain employment are intended to prevent dismiss-
als and preserve existing jobs. Among these instruments, the main ones 
are short-time work (STW) arrangements and compensation. 
Short-time work schemes
Short-time work may take the form of a temporary reduction in 
working time or a temporary layoff. In both cases, the employment 
relationship between employer and employee persists and the arrange-
ments have a limited duration (Arpaia et al. 2010). In the case of STW, 
compensation for income loss is usually envisaged in the form of social 
security payments. This compensation is either publicly funded—by 
means of taxes—or based on social security contributions. Neverthe-
less, STW compensation systems across Europe differ considerably 
from each other in terms of procedures, degree of involvement of trade 
unions, “back-to-normal” plans, coverage, compensations amount, 
and eligibility criteria. Moreover, it is possible to distinguish between 
well-established systems and new schemes introduced to face the crisis 
(Table 7.3).
In the fi rst case (which includes Germany, Austria, Belgium, France, 
and Italy, among others), the compensation system is part of the unem-
ployment benefi t (insurance) system, in that employers and employees 
pay social contributions to a fund or to the UI system so that in the event 
of STW or temporary layoff, employees are covered by this fund for the 
lost income as a consequence of a working hours reduction. Conversely, 
in member states (such as the Netherlands, Poland, Hungary, and Slova-
kia) that introduced, whether temporary or not, STW compensations as 
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a new measure during the crisis, such new arrangements are not part of 
the UI system and therefore they are funded by the state through taxes.
STW compensation systems may also be classifi ed on the basis of 
their function (Arpaia et al. 2010). In some national systems, they are 
part-time unemployment benefi ts. This means that employees working 
reduced hours or on temporary layoff are regarded as people working 
on a part-time basis seeking full-time employment. In some cases, they 
may have to be available for a new job despite the fact that the employ-
ment contract with their current employer is still in force. Regardless of 
function, in the majority of EU member states, this is true even if STW 
schemes envisage lost income compensation within the unemployment 
insurance system. Indeed, STW schemes represent a form of job protec-
tion against dismissal. 
With reference to this measure, it is possible to point out that it might 
be benefi cial to different actors involved in the national economic arena. 
Needless to say, employees benefi t from STW schemes since measures 
of this kind avoid dismissal and help maintain existing jobs, at the same 
time ensuring income support by compensating lost income. However, 
STW schemes also have many advantages for employers. First, these 
arrangements allow companies to preserve human capital and skills that 
will be necessary in the recovery phase. Second, they reduce potential 
costs related to personnel turnover, dismissal, the recruitment process, 
Table 7.3  Different Systems of Short-Time Work
Group I—Existing and/or adapted 
systems (Germany, Austria, Belgium, 
France, Italy, etc.)
Group II—Systems introduced to 
face the crisis (the Netherlands, 
Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, etc.)
STW arrangements are part of the 
unemployment benefi t/insurance 
system 
STW arrangements are not part of 
the unemployment benefi t/insurance 
system
The employer and (in some cases) 
the employees pay social 
contributions to a fund or to the 
UI system
STW arrangements are funded by 
taxes
In the event of STW or temporary 
layoff, employees are covered for 
the lost income 
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and training. Governments view STW compensation systems as conve-
nient measures, as they help maintain social peace and cohesion in that 
employers and employees share the impact of a downturn. Finally, such 
arrangements represent a fl exible tool for governments, such that they 
are able to control, to some extent, the adjustment of the labor market. 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LABOR MARKET MEASURES
This research tries to identify the system and policies that provide 
a higher level of effectiveness in tackling the crisis and unemployment, 
and to collect information that could be useful on a general basis while 
deciding which labor market policies to implement and which legal 
framework to apply. It is generally acknowledged that it takes time 
to evaluate the effectiveness of labor market measures. However, in a 
joint paper, EMCO and the EC provide some evidence for the effective-
ness of the main labor market policies adopted and implemented by 
EU member states during the crisis, and, more generally, they review 
evaluations of the effectiveness of similar measures implemented in the 
past (EMCO and EC 2010). The OECD, on the other hand, gives evi-
dence for the effectiveness of STW schemes applied during this reces-
sion (OECD 2010).
Considering the three different types of labor market policies exam-
ined in this chapter (measures to create employment or to promote rein-
tegration, measures to maintain employment, and income support for 
unemployed), measures to maintain employment in the form of STW 
arrangements, wage subsidies, or nonwage cost reductions are deemed 
to have been most successful in limiting the decrease in employ-
ment rates (Governatori et al. 2010) and the rise of unemployment, 
by preventing layoffs. Among measures of this kind implemented by 
the member states, some of them—particularly STW schemes—have 
proved more effective than others in preserving jobs (EMCO and EC 
2010; OECD 2010). Nevertheless, researchers point out critical issues 
related to STW arrangements, such as the fact that they may artifi cially 
maintain employment in declining industries instead of allowing for an 
effi cient reallocation of employment. There is general agreement about 
the potential negative impact—the deadweight loss—from distortions 
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due to this policy (OECD 2010). However, countermeasures can be 
taken to address these distortions. In particular, STW schemes can be 
provided for a shorter period of time and can be arranged on the basis 
of more precise eligibility criteria.
Regarding measures to create employment, job subsidies consist-
ing of hiring incentives or the reduction of nonwage labor costs are 
effective in terms of job creation, but they are costly measures that can 
lead to negative consequences in terms of the deadweight effect. At the 
same time, public sector job creation is less likely than other policies to 
provide positive impacts (Kluve 2006, 2008). 
With respect to measures that promote reintegration, training has 
a modest positive impact on employment. This kind of impact is more 
likely to be associated with times of high unemployment. But, in gen-
eral, positive training effects become evident in the long run, and it is 
not clear whether there is a positive or negative relation between the 
economic cycle and the effectiveness of this kind of measure. There-
fore, it is diffi cult to state how effective training programs may be dur-
ing the economic crisis (Kluve 2008). On the other hand, job search 
assistance and activation measures have a positive impact on employ-
ment and are effective in the short run, but they need an economic con-
text characterized by a growing or stable labor demand. In fact, only if 
there is labor demand is it possible to support job search and matching 
and help with reintegration into the labor market. For this reason, such 
measures are mainly appropriate in the recovery phase.
Generally speaking, income supports for the unemployed may have 
a negative effect on unemployment (OECD 2006) since their generosity 
(replacement rate and duration) discourage job search and reintegra-
tion into the labor market. In order to reduce the negative effects in 
terms of effi ciency, some adjustments can be and have been made, such 
as decreasing the amount of benefi ts and reducing the period through 
which such support is provided. In addition, unemployment benefi ts 
have to be made conditional on availability for suitable work and par-
ticipation in active labor market policies (ALMPs) and activation poli-
cies (OECD 2010). The majority of EU member states have moved in 
this direction, since in their systems, as shown in Table 7.4, unemploy-
ment benefi t recipients are required to actively search for work (in 18 
cases out of 27), to be immediately available for suitable work (almost 
all member states) and accept suitable job offers, and to be ready to 
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participate in the ALMPs (in 17 cases out of 27) commonly agreed on 
in an individual action plan or client contract. The plan or contract is 
established between the unemployment benefi t recipient and the public 
employment service and identifi es the rights and duties of both parties. 
Moreover, in the view of assuring the effectiveness of this conditional-
ity, sanctions are applied to recipients in cases of noncompliance with 
the above-mentioned obligations.
Table 7.4  Obligations of Unemployment Benefi t Recipients  








Denmark x x x
Germany x x x
Estonia x x
Greece x x






Lithuania x x x
Luxembourg x x
Hungary x x x
Malta x





Finland x x x
Slovenia x x
Slovakia x x x
Sweden x x x
United Kingdom x x x
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THE ROLE OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES IN THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF ALMPs
Public employment services are generally able to implement labor 
market measures. Therefore, they play a key role in supporting the 
(re)integration of the unemployed into the labor market and, in the end, 
employment levels. It is well known that the effective implementation 
of labor market policies depends on the effi ciency of public employ-
ment services (EC 2002). However, they may achieve their goals not 
only by acting directly through their organizations, but also through 
cooperation with other actors and stakeholders (i.e., other public orga-
nizations, social security institutions, social partners, other service 
providers, or education and training providers). From this perspective, 
European institutions themselves encourage the collaboration of public 
employment services with other service providers (Council of the Euro-
pean Union 2001, 2002; EC 1998). This relationship may even take the 
form of subcontracting services to private employment agencies, which 
generally allows public employment services to better deliver specifi c 
services for particular target groups among the unemployed (Anderson 
et al. 2009).
Employment services also play an important role with regard to 
the effectiveness of the conditionality of unemployment benefi ts on 
participation in ALMPs and on accepting suitable job offers. Looking 
at public employment services, the purpose of a consistent strategy is 
to facilitate the return of the unemployed and unemployment benefi t 
recipients into the labor market. To achieve this, public employment 
services and social security institutions must cooperate closely, which 
may develop into a merger between the two (Anderson et al. 2009). 
Indeed, in a number of EU member states (see Table 7.5) there is a 
single institution responsible for the provision of employment services 
and unemployment benefi ts. This trend is confi rmed by recent mergers 
in France and the Netherlands in 2009.
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PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON LABOR MARKET POLICIES
The question of effectiveness of labor market policies is funda-
mental not only with regard to crisis-related measures, but also for EU 
member states because of a rise in budgetary constraints. European 
institutions have reported that in 2009 EU countries increased their 
expenditure on labor market interventions and income supports by 0.7 
percent of annual GDP, while before the crisis, public expenditure on 
labor market policies had experienced a decline (EMCO and EC 2010). 
In fact, in 2008, public expenditure on labor market policies in the EU 
amounted to just 1.6 percent of total EU-27 GDP, although there was 
considerable variation between member states (see Figure 7.4).2 For 
this reason, EU governments need to be aware of the most effective 
policy mix in order to direct the public expenditure. It is interesting to 
compare data on labor market policy expenditures and trends in unem-
ployment rates among the different EU countries during the crisis. The 
data on public expenditures for all countries are available only 18–20 
months after the reference period, and as a result, Eurostat provides, at 
the moment, only data for 2008. 
Table 7.5  Institutions Responsible for the Provision of Employment 
Services and Unemployment Benefi ts
Austria Arbeitsmarktservice (AMS)
France Pôle emploi: (ANPE + Assedic)
Germany Bundesagentur für Arbeit (Federal Employment Agency)
Estonia Eesti Töötukassa
Greece Greek Manpower Employment Organization (OAED)
Luxembourg Administration de l’emploi (ADEM)
Slovenia Employment Service of Slovenia
The Netherlands Location for Work and Income: Centre for Work and 
Income + Uitvoeringsinstitut werknemersverzekeringen 
(Employee Insurance Agency)
United Kingdom Jobcentre Plus (merger of Employment Service and 
Benefi ts Agency, 2002)















































Total LMP expenditure 2008 Unemployment rate change 2009Q2–2008Q2
Figure 7.4  Total LMP Expenditure and Unemployment Rate Change 2009Q2–2008Q2
SOURCE: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat data.
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In any case, considering that the impact of labor market policies 
(LMPs) on the labor market requires a period of time to become evident, 
it seems reasonable to compare data on public expenditure for 2008 and 
unemployment rate growth over the last two years. Member states that 
had the lowest increases in unemployment rates in 2009 compared to 
2008 were those that spent the most on labor market policies in 2008. 
As Figure 7.4 shows, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria 
spent more than 1.8 percent of their GDP on LMPs and saw very small 
levels of unemployment growth or even declines in unemployment dur-
ing this period. Figure 7.5 shows that this trend is confi rmed even if we 
compare the growth in unemployment rate between 2008 and 2010 and 
the labor market policies expenditure for 2008.
When the data on public expenditures for 2009 are available for all 
countries, it will also be interesting to verify if and to what extent the 
increase in unemployment affected public expenditure.
POLICIES ADAPTED OR ADOPTED BY THE EU 
MEMBER STATES
By analyzing the different measures implemented by the EU mem-
ber states, it is possible to observe a relationship between different 
combinations of labor market measures applied by EU countries and 
their social models. From this perspective, it is necessary to consider 
in toto the set of labor market policies—both new and amended—that 
the EU member states put into action to face the crisis. Table 7.6 repre-
sents,  without the pretention of being exhaustive, the measures adopted 
or adapted (if already existing) by each EU member state against this 
background. The EU countries have been identifi ed by their levels of 
unemployment rate growth (considering the difference between July 
2010 and July 2008), ranked from the best to the worst in terms of per-
formance. It should be pointed out that those countries with the most 
signifi cant increases in unemployment rates are those that did not envis-
age or did not amend existing STW schemes. 
On the other hand, EU member states with good labor market per-
formance, such as Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, Austria, and, to 
some extent, Italy, already had measures of this kind in their labor mar-




























































Figure 7.5  Total LMP Expenditure and Unemployment Rate Change 2010/07–2008/07
SOURCE: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat data.
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ket systems. Furthermore, these countries made such labor market poli-
cies more fl exible over the past few years, in consideration of the needs 
of the moment, and improved or adapted these policies by combining 
them with training and/or activation measures. Other well-performing 
countries, such as the Netherlands and Romania, have introduced (even 
on a temporary basis) STW schemes to face the recession.
The next step is to contextualize these different combinations of 
policies in the wider regulatory framework of national labor markets. 
In this view, two main social models are taken into consideration: the 
welfare system model and the fl exicurity model (Table 7.7). 
The fi rst system is characterized by rigid employment protection 
legislation (particularly in the event of dismissal), an ungenerous unem-
ployment benefi t system, and a minimum level of implementation of 
ALMPs and activation of policies through public employment services. 
It is noteworthy that the welfare system model developed over the years 
an active component, which in the past was very limited or absent. On 
the other hand, the fl exicurity model is based on a nonrestrictive dis-
missal protection legislation, a generous unemployment benefi t system, 
high levels of implementation of ALMPs and activation policies, and 
effi cient public employment services. Examples of the fi rst model can 
be found in countries like Germany, Austria, Belgium, and Italy, while 
Denmark has always been the model for fl exicurity, together with Fin-
land, Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands. 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL MODELS
By looking at the labor market performance of the EU member 
states, and by considering their social models, some interesting remarks 
and comments are possible.
Regarding growth in the unemployment rate during the crisis, Ger-
many, Belgium, Austria, and to some extent Italy, are considered to be 
the countries with the lowest increases. The social model of all these 
EU member states is classifi ed as a welfare system. On the other hand, 
Denmark, which, as mentioned, is regarded as a role model of fl exicu-
rity, experienced a high increase in unemployment. This country has 
been and still is, in fact, an interesting case with reference to the per-
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formance of the labor market during the crisis. Before the crisis, this 
system ensured a low unemployment rate and a quick reintegration of 
jobseekers into the labor market. During the crisis, however, this sys-
tem proved to have some shortcomings. In fact, by September 2009, 
Denmark had doubled its level of unemployment: from 3.2 percent in 
July 2008 to 6.5 percent in September 2009 (Denmark reached its high-
est level of unemployment, 7.4 percent, in April 2010).
The aim of this system is not to prevent dismissal but rather to 
support a quick job-to-job transition and reintegration into the labor 
market. Nevertheless, if the labor demand is low, then reintegration 
is impossible or very diffi cult. In addition, Denmark does not envis-
age a “real” STW compensation system even though companies may 
use STW arrangements and employees involved are eligible for part-
time unemployment benefi ts. Employees must fulfi ll the contributory 
requirements for eligibility for total unemployment benefi ts and have to 
be available for a new working activity despite the fact that the employ-
ment contract with their current employer is still in force. However, in 
practice this provision is not strictly applied if the employee has the 
possibility of staying with his or her current company.
Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands (plus Norway, which is not 
an EU member) also use the fl exicurity system. While they had better 
labor market performance than Denmark during the recession, these 
countries still experienced an increase in their unemployment rates 
amounting to more than 2 percent (the Netherlands was the only excep-
tion, with an increase of 1.6 percent). There is an important difference 
between Denmark and the other fl exicurity countries—employment 
protection legislation. Denmark has liberally oriented employment pro-
tection legislation, while the other fl exicurity countries, which utilize 
a welfare system, have more stringent employment protection legisla-
tion (see Table 7.8). Among fl exicurity countries, the Netherlands is the 
only country characterized by a lower rise in its unemployment rate. It 
introduced a temporary STW compensation, while Finland’s is similar 
to Denmark, and Sweden does not envisage any.
On the basis of these observations, it clearly emerges that countries 
utilizing the welfare system model had lower increases in unemploy-
ment rates, while fl exicurity countries, especially Denmark, experi-
enced higher rises. Thus, the welfare system model appears to be more 
effective in facing the crisis, while the fl exicurity system has diffi cul-
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ties controlling the increase in unemployment. This situation seems to 
depend on the presence in welfare system models of two complemen-
tary and interrelated elements: STW arrangements and a stringent regu-
lation against (individual or collective) dismissal. However, consider-
ing social models and labor market policy combinations applied by EU 
member states, there is no unique “best solution” to tackle “different 
kinds” of economic recessions. It is also important to understand the 
Table 7.8  OECD Employment Protection Legislation Index
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context and the legal framework in which any possible solution has to 
be implemented.
CONCLUSION: LESSON FROM THE CRISIS 
The fi nancial crisis has created a sort of laboratory in which it was 
possible to conduct natural experiments on the functioning of differ-
ent national systems, created through a combination of the social secu-
rity system, employment protection legislation, the public employment 
services system, and labor market policies. Over the last two decades, 
when considering labor market policies to be implemented by Euro-
pean countries, the OECD and European Commission put an empha-
sis mainly on active labor market policies rather than passive ones, 
thus supporting mainly public interventions utilizing active measures. 
Therefore, before the crisis, these international institutions largely rec-
ommended fl exicurity principles dominated by external fl exibility and 
employment security based on nonrestrictive or low-restrictive employ-
ment protection legislation (and dismissal protection legislation), sup-
ported by a generous unemployment benefi t system, effi cient public 
employment services, and high levels of ALMPs. From this point of 
view, prevailing measures aimed to create employment or, better yet, 
promote reintegration, giving momentum to job-to-job transition. In 
fact, by launching the EU fl exicurity strategy, the EU promoted internal 
and external fl exicurity “accompanied by secure transition from job to 
job” (European Commission 2007).
Looking from this standpoint at policy packages applied by EU 
member states, at the beginning of the crisis there was a critical view 
of STW arrangements. In fact, observers and commentators constantly 
pointed out the labor market distortions and limitations associated with 
these schemes. One frequent criticism was that since they were income 
support measures, they demonstrated the passive nature of labor mar-
ket policy. But more recently, and perhaps thanks to the effectiveness 
in tackling the crisis, authors look at these schemes in a different way. 
Indeed, a report from the Eurofound (Mandl et al. 2010) describing 
the effectiveness of STW schemes tries to link these measures to the 
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fl exicurity principle by stressing how they serve the implementation of 
fl exicurity. Considering how STW schemes function, it is easy to see 
them as tools for fl exicurity, combining internal fl exibility and job and 
income security. In fact, the possibility of reducing work hours (up to 
zero hours) allows internal fl exibility for employers (based exactly on 
fl exible working-time arrangements). At the same time, this provision 
prevents dismissals and helps employees stay in their current positions, 
enhancing job security. Moreover, wage compensation linked to STW 
arrangements ensures income security for the employees, thanks to the 
continuity of income granted through either a wage or unemployment 
benefi ts. 
Considering now the other types of labor market policy measures 
mentioned above in terms of fl exicurity, measures to promote reinte-
gration and to create employment are fundamental resources for guar-
anteeing employment security, at least through continuity of employ-
ment, although not necessarily with the same employer. On the other 
hand, income support for unemployed people has the obvious purpose 
of ensuring income security in case of dismissal and can be seen as 
complementary to external fl exibility. Before the crisis, EU institu-
tions pressed for welfare systems to move toward the fl exicurity model. 
But the economic downturn raised the awareness of the fact that the 
EU formulation of the fl exicurity strategy was suitable for a period of 
economic growth and to face structural unemployment, which needs 
particular measures to support (re-)integration by addressing job mis-
match, supporting job matching by means of counseling, career guid-
ance, search assistance, activation measures, and by increasing employ-
ability through training. 
Indeed, a fl exicurity strategy based on external fl exibility and 
employment security was not able to withstand the impact of the reces-
sion. In such a situation, in fact, in order to limit the related socio-
economic consequences, policy measures to maintain employment and 
keep employees at work turned out to be indispensable. A lesson has 
been provided by the crisis: both welfare and fl exicurity models under-
went changes due to the adaptation or introduction of specifi c labor 
market policies to face the crisis. For example, welfare models have 
developed activation and training measures, while some fl exicurity 
models adopted some kind of STW arrangements. Each model has taken 
up some elements of the other one, particularly those useful to tackle 
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the crisis. This process of adjustment due to the recession resulted in a 
convergence of the two social models.
Notes
 1. At the international level, the International Labour Conference (2009) adopted a 
Global Jobs pact.
 2. At the moment of closing the article, Eurostat provided data for 2009 just for a few 
EU member states.
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